WIGHTMAN DOTH PROTEST TOO MUCH ABOUT LAW LICENSE; LOSES APPEAL AT EVERY TURN

(There is a saying in Spanish that says "la defensa propia es permitida," which translates roughly to self defense is permissible. After having watched our friends and community mauled by rogue blogger Robert Wightman – a disbarred attorney from Dallas – we have decided that perhaps our fellow residents may want to know a little more about this actor. Toward that end we have started an informational blog that you can access by simply clicking on the graphic at top right [The Wightman Contra-Intelligence Files]. Periodically, we will add more. The fifth installment is below. Happy reading!) 
By Juan Montoya
For someone who claims that getting back his law license would be the easiest thing in the world and that the only reason he doesn't is because he prefers not to associate with the world's crookedest profession, Robert Wightman has labored mightily to get it back.
Wightman was disbarred on Jan. 11, 2002 in the the 298th District Court of Dallas County.
The court found that: Wightman brought or defended a frivolous proceeding. The court also found Wightman took a position that unreasonably increased the costs or other burdens of a case and delayed the resolution of the case. Wightman, in representing a client, engaged in conduct engaged to disrupt a proceeding. Wightman was also found to have communicated with another party regarding a case when he knew that party was represented by counsel. The court also found Wightman made a statement that was either false or with reckless disregard to its truth regarding the qualifications or integrity of a judge. Wightman failed to timely respond to notice of the complaint from the grievance committee. He violated Rules 3.01, 3.02, 3.04(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(5), 3.05(a), 4.02(a), 4.04(a) and (b)(1), 8.02(a), and 8.04(a)(1) and (a)(8). He was ordered to pay $48,700.72 in attorney’s fees, which is subject to reduction."
Another court later found that he was charging clients for legal advice without a license and he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor instead of fighting it as a felony that might have cost him up to two years in a state prison. In his plea agreement to avoid the felony conviction, he confessed:
"I judicially confess to the following facts and agree and stipulate that these facts are true and correct and constitute the evidence in this case:
On the 9th of June A.D., 2003, in Dallas County, Texas, I did intentionally and knowingly then and there, while not licensed to practice law in this state, another state, or a foreign county, and with the intent to obtain an economic benefit for myself, advise Dr. Dan Leong as to the rights of the said Dr. Dan Leong and the advisability of making a claim for property damages, in a legal dispute with Dr. David Stones." 
Eventually, he had to serve 14 days in county jail.
He was disbarred by the U.S. Supreme Court later in March 2004.
After that – for the better part of four years and despite his protestations – Wightman sought to regain his license by claiming through the appeals courts that the disbarrment and subsequent jailing for on his guilty misdemeanor plea were unconstitutional for a number of reasons.
In 1996, Wightman appealed his disbarment that was subsequently upheld by the U.S. District Court in Dallas to the 5th Court of Appeals, and lost. The memorandum, written by Brownsville's own Reynaldo Garza, found that:
"(Wightman) brought his action "in August, 1995, against Appellees, the Texas Supreme Court and the State Bar of Texas, seeking declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief. Wightman sought to enjoin the State Bar from proceeding with its disciplinary action against him on the basis that (it) violated his right to free speech and that the complaint failed to provide him with adequate notice of the claim against him...
After a hearing, the district court denied Wightman's application for a temporary restraining order and granted Appellees' motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the action on abstention grounds. The court also found that Wightman had no likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, that he possessed an adequate remedy at law, that the harm to the Defendants by the issuance of an injunction would exceed the harm to Wightman, and that the public interest would not be served by the issuance of an injunction or restraining order...
Wightman filed a motion for a new trial which was denied by the district court. He then brought this timely appeal of the order of dismissal and denial of injunctive relief.   For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the order dismissing the suit on abstention grounds. Our holding that the district court properly abstained from interfering in an ongoing state proceeding obviates discussion of Wightman's request for preliminary injunctive relief..."
But Judge Garza was not done yet. He dissected Wightman's argument that he did not understand the rules which disbarred him and said:
"(He) also claims that he was not informed which rule he allegedly violated and that appeal would be futile because the Texas Supreme Court “has already announced its position” that the challenged speech is not protected by the First Amendment.
The first argument seems foolish. The first sentence of the grievance form states that Attorney Wightman has made numerous statements that he knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of (various judges)...Wightman is not ignorant as to the charge against him. As for the Texas Supreme Court's pronouncement, such argument was made in a responsive pleading as part of litigation, not as a judicial declaration of law. Wightman cannot yet claim that appeal would be futile."
He followed his quixotic appeal to regain his license November 12, 2002 in the United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.
Again, Bobby sagacious legal theories were ingloriously shot down.
The court said: "we decline to disregard the judgment in a case like this one, where the attorney had a right under state law to challenge his disbarment on appeal but did not pursue that remedy...The attorney must have been denied due process; the federal court must have a clear conviction that the proof was infirm; or the court must have a grave reason to deny the judgment reciprocal effect. Deference could give way to de novo judgment, and respect to indifference, were it possible for a disbarred attorney to forgo state appellate rights in hopes of persuading a federal tribunal that the state court had erred in applying state law. We decline the invitation to disregard the state court judgment on the ground that it is void under state law...
"When a district court learns that a member of its bar has been subject to discipline by another jurisdiction, the identical discipline is typically imposed. We discern no grounds not to impose the same discipline as did the State of Texas. Indeed, we think it would be only the most unusual case in which we would not revoke the membership of an attorney who has been disbarred by the State of Texas. We therefore revoke Wightman's membership in the bar of this court."
Then, in 2004, he again was shot down in federal court. It found that:
"The court is left with nothing more than plaintiff's unsubstantiated accusations and paranoid ruminations that he was prosecuted in retaliation for speaking out against corruption in the judicial system and that the actions of the state court judge deprived him of a fair trial...
"As grounds for his motion, plaintiff alleged that he was in the process of moving to Brownsville, Texas and did not have sufficient time to conduct discovery or subpoena witnesses to testify at the hearing...
"This case should be dismissed without prejudice."
Finally, in April 6, 2005, the the last blow was delivered to the Wightman saga to have the federal courts throw out his disbarrment:
"Wightman appears to argue that his criminal prosecution was pursued in bad faith. The magistrate judge scheduled an evidentiary hearing to provide him an opportunity to present evidence to establish this claim. The magistrate judge denied Wightman request for a continuance and ordered him to attend the hearing. In his order denying the continuance motion, the magistrate judge explained that the factual basis for Wightman bad faith claims was not entirely clear from his pleadings.
He stated that he would give him the opportunity to proffer facts in support of his claim and, if Wightman concluded that he needed to conduct formal discovery, he could reurge his motion for continuance immediately before the scheduled hearing. In his recommendation, the magistrate judge explains that the day before the hearing, he received from Wightman a brief in opposition to the hearing and an unsigned motion for continuance, and he did not appear for the hearing."
"The State is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and the action against it is dismissed without prejudice. The court abstains...against Judge Nancarrow and Hill, and it dismisses the actions against them without prejudice."